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Abstract
Many concepts in legal texts are “intermediaries”, in the sense that they serve as links between statements of legal grounds,
on one hand, and of legal consequences, on the other. In our paper, an algebraic representation of normative systems is used for
distinguishing between different kinds of intermediaries and making the idea of a joining between grounds and consequences more
precise.
In Section 1, the idea of intermediaries is presented and earlier discussions of the subjects are outlined. In Section 2, we introduce
the algebraic framework and develop the formal theory. After introducing our approach to the representation of a normative system,
we here present a theory of “intervenients”, seen as a tool for analysing intermediaries. In Section 3, dealing with applications,
after presenting a model of the formal theory, suited for the analysis of concepts in normative systems, we apply the theory to a
number of examples, introduced in the first part. Finally, in Section 4, we make some remarks on the methodology of intermediate
concepts.
© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Background and informal exposition
1.1. Introduction
The role played by concept formation in philosophy and science has been varying. After some decades of rather
low interest, there are signs indicating that the situation is changing. The aim of the present paper is to contribute to
the study of this field. More specifically, our contribution aims at presenting a framework for analysing the role of
what we call “intermediaries” (or “intermediate concepts”) as links between conceptual structures.
A Scandinavian discussion on intermediate concepts in the law started more than sixty years ago. In 1951, two
well-known essays were published that dealt with “ownership” as an intermediate concept, namely Alf Ross’s essay
on “Tû-Tû” and Anders Wedberg’s essay on the logical analysis of legal science. However, the debate began already
in 1944–1945 through papers by Wedberg and Per-Olof Ekelöf. (See [18,20] for references to Ross, Wedberg and
Ekelöf.).
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that includes intermediate concepts (intermediaries). The other concern is about legal argumentation, namely how
arguments about legal concepts are constructed and how the meanings of legal terms are moulded. In [16–18], both
concerns are in view; the same holds for [27], dealing with public and private interest in urban planning.
Within the field of artificial intelligence and law, recent works by Ashley & Brüninghaus [2] and Atkinson and
Bench-Capon [3,4], dealing with legal argumentation, pay attention to the role of intermediate concepts. Ashley and
Brüninghaus focus on the predictive role of such concepts, Atkinson and Bench-Capon incorporate them as one of
their three levels of argumentation.
An important contribution to the study of concept formation in normative systems is made in the theory of “Counts-
as”, first presented in [12]. The theory is further developed in the work of Grossi, Meyer and Dignum, as well as in the
work of Boella and van der Torre. (See [8,9], with references, and [5], with references.) As will appear, although there
seem be interrelationships, the background, framework and scope of our theory of intermediaries is different from the
theory of “Counts-as”.
In a series of papers, from the end of the 1990s and forward, we have aimed at developing a framework for
representing normative systems and showing its applications. (See [20–25,30–32].) A normative system is seen as a
deductive mechanism yielding an output of deontic consequences for an input of facts (or “legal grounds”).1 Among
legal norms, called “joinings” and represented by ordered pairs 〈a1, a2〉 of grounds and consequences, special attention
is given to “minimal joinings” (“connections”) and “couplings”.2
Intermediaries represent a specific topic within our theory of normative systems. (Some of the papers just men-
tioned do not deal with this topic.) In [19] we presented a first model for analysing the notion of intermediary, further
developed in [20]. The present paper (as well as the preliminary work in [24,25]), where we return specifically to the
subject-matter of intermediaries, is different in several respects. The framework to be developed is based on the theory
of Boolean algebra instead of lattice theory as was the case in [20]. The structures dealt with are not necessarily finite.
The basic kind of relations considered are quasi-orderings rather than partial orderings as was the case in our previous
paper, where partial orderings were introduced by a transition to equivalence classes. Also, the introduction of the
notion of “intervenient” represents a new feature of our theory.
The basic formal framework is abstract in the sense that the main results are not tied to a specific interpretation
in terms of what we call “conditions”. Thus, the so-called cis model (cis for “condition implication structure”) of the
abstract theory, where the domains of the orderings have conditions as their members, only plays the part of one of
several models for the theory.
In a complex normative system, such as an existing legal system, norms are general, with cross-references between
variables in antecedents and consequents.3 If the primary aim is to provide an overall representation of such a complex
normative system, the cis model has limitations, compared with predicate logic. However, as we intend to show, the
model is appropriate for the more specific purpose that concerns analysis and typologies of intermediaries within
normative systems. The model, so we believe, provides means for seeing and formulating distinctions and features
that elucidate the different character of various kinds of intermediaries in actual normative systems.
In Section 1, the idea of intermediaries is presented and earlier discussions of the subjects are outlined. In Sec-
tion 2, we introduce a more rigorous framework and develop the formal theory. Thus, after introducing our approach
to the representation of a normative system, we present a theory of “intervenients”, seen as a tool for analysing in-
termediaries. In Section 3, dealing with applications, we present a model (cis model) of the formal theory, suited for
the analysis of concepts in normative systems and the theory is applied to a number of examples, introduced in the
first part. (Also, there is a brief comment on the Counts-as theory, see Section 3.5.3.) Finally, in the Section 4, some
remarks on the methodology of intermediate concepts are given.
1 The linking of legal consequences to legal grounds bears some affinity to the correlating of cases to solutions, as analysed by Alchourrón and
Bulygin. See [1] and cf. Section 1.1 of [23].
2 Our approach of treating norms as ordered pairs bears some similarities to the view of norms in the work of Makinson and van der Torre on
“Input-Output logic”. See [26], with further references.
3 Cf. [23, Section 1.1].
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1.2.1. Facts, deontic positions and intermediaries
Legal rules attach obligations, rights, deontic positions to facts, i.e., actions, events, circumstances. Deontic posi-
tions are, so we might say, legal consequences of these facts. Facts and deontic positions are objects of two different
sorts; we might call them Is-objects and Ought-objects. In a legal system, when Ought-objects are said to be “attached
to” or to be “consequences of” Is-objects there is a sense of direction. In a legal system, inferences and arguments go
from Is-objects to Ought-objects, not vice versa.
In the Is/Ought partition, something very essential is missing, namely the great bulk of more specific legal concepts.
A few examples are: property, tort, contract, trust, possession, guardianship, matrimony, citizenship, crime, responsi-
bility, punishment. These concepts are links between grounds on the left-hand side and normative consequences on
the right-hand side of the scheme just given:
Facts Links Deontic positions
Events Ownership Obligations
Actions Valid contract Claims
Circumstances Citizenship (etc.) Powers (etc.)
Using this three-column scheme, we might say that ownership, valid contract, citizenship etc. are attached to certain
facts, and that deontic positions, in turn, are attached to these legal positions.
To exemplify: Among the facts justifying an assertion that there is a valid contract between two parties are: that
the parties have made an agreement, that they were in a sane state of mind when agreeing, that no force or deceit was
used by any of them in the process, and so on. The deontic positions attached to there being a valid contract between
them depend on what they have agreed on but are formulated in terms of claims and duties, legal powers etc. In the
example, the facts are stated in terms of communicative acts, mental states and other descriptive notions, while the
deontic positions are stated in normative or deontic terms.
1.2.2. Wedberg and Ross on ownership
In the 1950s, each of the two Scandinavians Wedberg and Ross proposed the idea that a legal term such as “own-
ership”, or “x is the owner of y at time t” is a syntactical tool serving the purpose of economy of expression of a set
of legal rules [34–36].
As an example, the function of the term “ownership” is illustrated as follows by Ross [34,35]:
Ross’s scheme is aimed at representing a set of legal rules concerning ownership in a particular legal system (for
example the rules on ownership in Danish law at a specific time). In the picture, the letters are to be interpreted as
follows:
F1 − Fp for: x has lawfully purchased y, x has inherited y, x has acquired y by prescription, and so on.
C1 − Cn for: judgement for recovery shall be given in favour of x against other persons retaining y in their pos-
session, judgement for damages shall be given in favour of x against other persons who culpably damage y, if x has
raised a loan from z that it is not repaid at the proper time, z shall be given judgement for satisfaction out of y, and so
on.
The letter “O” is a link between the left-hand side and the right-hand side. It can be read “x is the owner of y”.
In Ross’s scheme, the number of implications to ownership from the grounds for ownership is p (since the grounds
are F1, . . . ,Fp); similarly the number of implications from ownership to consequences of ownership is n (since there
are n consequences). Therefore, the total number of implications in the scheme is p + n. On the other hand, if the
rules were formulated by attaching each Cj among the consequences to each Fi among the grounds, the number of
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p + n, a number that is much smaller [36, pp. 273f]. In this way, economy of expression is obtained.
The similarities between Wedberg’s and Ross’s ideas are striking. Both use the example of ownership. Central
ideas propounded by both of them are: By use of the linking term, the number p · n of rules is reduced to p + n, and,
the linking term has no independent meaning (Wedberg) or has no semantical reference (Ross).
In our view, there is a great difference between speaking of an expression like “O is the property of P at t” as
meaningless and speaking of it as being without independent meaning. The latter way of speaking goes well together
with the view that the term has meaning but that this meaning consists precisely in its occurrence and use in inference
rules linking the term to facts, on one hand, and to deontic consequences on the other.
1.2.3. Gentzen’s rules of introduction and elimination
Consider a pair of legal rules:
Legal rule linking descriptive concept a to legal concept m:
Intro: For all x, y : If a(x, y) then m(x,y).
Legal rule linking legal concept m to deontic concept b:
Elim: For all x, y : If m(x,y) then b(x, y).
The rules Intro and Elim can be compared to the rules of introduction and rules of elimination, respectively, in
Gentzen’s theory of natural deduction in [7]. 1f this comparison is made, Intro is regarded as an introduction rule and
Elim as an elimination rule for m. An obvious difference is that while Gentzen’s introduction rules and elimination
rules are rules of inference, the rules Intro and Elim are formulated in “if, then” sentences of predicate logic. A reason
for the difference is, of course, that Gentzen aims at providing a theory for predicate logic, and, therefore, the language
of predicate logic itself is not admissible within his theory.
From the conjunction of Intro and Elim is derived:
Deriv: For all x, y : If a(x, y) then b(x, y).
We note that m is used for deriving b(x, y) from a(x, y) and that, therefore, Intro and Elim have a point only in
combination.4
1.2.4. The problem of open legal concepts
Let us consider the introduction rule for a legal concept. In some cases the introduction would be made by the two
rules:
Intro m: For all x, y : If a(x, y) then m(x,y),
Intro not −m: For all x, y : If not a(x, y) then not m(x,y),
which is to say that the introduction rule is a bi-conditional, not a mere conditional. For example, with regard to
ownership we can plausibly suppose that the set of grounds for ownership (purchase, inheritance, etc.) is closed so
that we have a bi-conditional.
For some legal concepts, however, the introduction rule given by legislation and precedent is a mere conditional.
An example might be the introduction rule for what, in Swedish law, is called “having a relationship similar to being
married” (cf. [20, pp. 168 f.]).
If two persons are not married, nevertheless they can have a relationship similar to being married. From such a
condition particular legal consequences follow by the law. First, if the relationship is dissolved, property acquired
by one of the parties for use in common shall be partitioned between the parties according to rules similar to those
applied when a marriage is dissolved. Secondly, if the relationship of the parties is dissolved, their dwelling can be
allotted to that party who needs it most.
4 In Gentzen’s Untersuchungen über das logische Schliessen, the “meaning” of the connectives is held to be given by the introduction rules.
Die Einführungen stellen sozusagen die “Definitionen” der betreffenden Zeichen dar, und die Beseitigungen sind letzten Endes nur Konse-
quenzen hiervon, . . . Bei der Beseitigung eines Zeichens darf die betreffende Formel, . . . , nur “als das benutzt werden, was sie auf Grund der
Einführung dieses Zeichens bedeutet” [7, p. 189]. (Gentzen’s quotation marks.)
On this point, Gentzen’s introduction rules differ from the legal rules “introducing” a legal term. If the meaning of a legal term is defined in
terms of the “grounds”, the consequences attached do not depend exclusively on what the legal term means as being so introduced.
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are a number of criteria. Let us consider the following eleven criteria, calling them a1, a2, . . . , a11:
a1 : cohabiting, a2 : housekeeping in common, a3 : having children in common, a4 : having sexual intercourse,
a5 : having confirmed the relation by a contract, a6 : living in emotional fellowship, a7 : being faithful, a8 : giving
mutual support, a9 : sharing economic assets and debts, a10 : having no legal impediments to marriage, a11 : having
no similar relationship to another person.
If we write m for “relationship similar to being married” two established introduction rules for m are as follows
(for all x, y):
Intro m: If a1(x, y) and a2(x, y) and . . . and a11(x, y), then m(x,y).
Intro not −m: If not a1(x, y) and not a2(x, y) and . . . and not a11(x, y), then not m(x,y).
In other words: If all of the criteria are satisfied by persons x and y, their relationship is “similar to being married”.
Conversely, if none of them is satisfied, their relationship is not “similar to being married”. These two rules belong to
established law.
However, the law does not say what is the result if some of the conditions are satisfied while others are not. This
means that, in a sense, the set of grounds for having a relationship similar to being married is “open”, and the grounds
are not specified completely.
Very many legal concepts are “ground-open” like “relationship similar to being married”. When such a concept
occurs in a legal argument, there is room and need for decisions to be made by courts and other authorities applying
the law. This task is an obstacle to reductionist efforts to do away with legal intermediaries and in favour of rules
attaching deontic positions directly to factual events, actions, or circumstances. In legal argument from facts to deontic
positions, the argument is a sequence of steps, passing through a number of stations involving legal concepts. Insofar
as the concepts are open, decisions have to be made step by step.
“Relationship similar to being married” is a concept that is ground-open, in the sense we have indicated. Similarly,
a legal concept can be consequence-open. Taking a concept like “ownership”, “citizenship” or “matrimony”, for
some deontic consequences it is established that they do follow, for others it is established that they do not follow.
However, there are as well consequences for which it is not established whether they follow or not. Then the concept
is consequence-open.
“Being the owner of” can serve as an example of a concept that is to some extent consequence-open. Thus it need
not, for example, be entirely settled to what extent and by what means the owner of an estate may exclude others from
entering on his/her ground.
1.3. Grounds and consequences in Dummett’s theory of language
Dummett distinguishes between the conditions for applying a term and the consequences of its application. Ac-
cording to Dummett both are part of the meaning. Dummett exemplifies by the use of the term “Boche” as a pejorative
term (cf. [14]).
The condition for applying the term to someone is that he is of German nationality; the consequences of its appli-
cation are that he is barbarous and more prone to cruelty than other Europeans. We should envisage the minimal
joinings in both directions as sufficiently tight as to be involved in the very meaning of the word: neither could be
severed without altering its meaning. Someone who rejects the word does so because he does not want to permit
a transition from the grounds for applying the term to the consequences of doing so. The addition of the term
“Boche” to a language which did not previously contain it would produce a non-conservative extension, i.e., one
in which certain statements which did not contain the term were inferable from other statements not containing it
which were not previously inferable [6, p. 454].5
5 Since the example is interesting from a philosophical point of view, we use it even though it has the disagreeable feature of being offensive to
German nationals.
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Elim: One rule linking a concept a to an intermediary m and one rule linking intermediary m to a concept b, see
Section 1.2.3. (Cf. also [11].)
If the standpoint “meaning is use” is adopted, it can be held that the meaning of m is given by two rules Intro and
Elim together. To understand the meaning of an intermediary m is to know how it is used in such a pair of rules.
Dummett intends his example to illustrate a non-conservative extension. In Section 3, where applications of our
formal framework is discussed and we return to Dummett’s example, we will indicate how this idea is expressed
within our framework.
Dummett’s example is not concerned with a legal system and with an inference from facts to deontic positions.6
We note, however, that the antecedent “being of German nationality” in Intro and the consequent “being more prone”
etc. in Elim are conditions of “different kinds”.
Other well-known examples, outside the area of connections from descriptive to normative, are the connection
from physical to mental and the connection from chemical to biological. At a very general level (cf. [30]), in empirical
science, there is the problem of the connection from observable to theoretical.7
1.4. Intermediaries
In Section 3, applying our formal theory to a number of examples, we will use the term “intermediary” for a number
of (mostly legal) expressions. For characterising intermediaries in a general sense, we can make use of ideas in the
Dummett quotation above and say that an expression is an intermediary if the conditions for applying the expression
and the consequences of its application are of different kinds, provided that “the minimal joinings in both directions is
sufficiently tight as to be involved in the very meaning” of the expression. We might add that the “point” or function
of the expression is to connect items of the two different kinds and that there is a sense of direction from one of these
kinds to the other.
In a legal system, examples of putative intermediaries are such expressions as “being the owner of” (a thing),
“being a citizen” (of a country), “having a relationship similar to being married” (in the law of taxation and property),
“being jobs of equal value” (in the law on equal opportunity).
In the present paper, we are interested in such intermediaries m where there is an Intro and an Elim for m such that
the antecedent a in Intro and the consequent b in Elim are of two different kinds K1 and K2, and where the pair 〈a, b〉,
called Deriv, characterises m.8 In particular, we are interested in such m where K1 is descriptive and K2 is normative
(deontic).
In some cases, the pair 〈a, b〉 characterises m completely, while in other cases it does so only partially. Consider
the example of “having a relationship similar to being married” (cf. Section 1.2.4). As illustrated, the situation can
be that there is a rule Intro m, allowing the introduction of m(x,y) by the conjunction of a1(x, y), . . . , a11(x, y) and
a rule Intro not − m excluding the introduction of m(x,y) by the conjunction of not − a1(x, y), . . . ,not − a11(x, y).
However, as exemplified, the introduction of m(x,y) can also be the result of judgements based on what holds of x
and y for other conditions than the antecedents in Intro m and Intro not − m. If c is considered (presupposing that
6 A legal example of a non-conservative extension might be the concept of “registered partnership” between two women or two men, as created
by the Swedish Act on registered partnership of 1994. The introduction of the term “registered partnership” by this Act was an extension of the
language of Swedish law, and the Act specifies conditions for application of the term as well as consequences of application. Due to these rules,
certain statements about legal consequences that were not previously derivable can be derived from certain statements about grounds.
7 An interesting approach to the problem of intermediate terms in mechanics was outlined in the nineteenth century by Henri Poincaré. Poincaré
pointed out that a proposition like “the stars obey Newton’s laws” can be broken up into two others, namely (1) “gravitation obeys Newton’s laws”
and (2) “gravitation is the only force acting on the stars”. Among these, proposition (1) is a definition and not subject to the test of experiment,
while (2) is subject to such a test. “Gravitation”, according to Poincaré, is an intermediary (un intermédiaire). Poincaré maintains that in science,
when there is a relation between two facts A and B, an intermediary C is often introduced by the formulation of one relationship between A and
C, and another between C and B. The relation between A and C, then, is often elevated to a principle, not subject to revision, while the relation
between C and B is a law, subject to such revision. See [33, pp. 124 f.], in the chapter “Is science artificial?” On the analogous question of definition
and norm in a normative system, cf. [17, p. 298].
8 For saying that the pair 〈a, b〉 “characterizes” m, it should be required that (quoting Dummett) the implication from a to m and from m to b
is “sufficiently tight as to be involved in the very meaning” of m. If c implies m or m implies d where these implications are not involved in the
meaning of m, the pair 〈c, b〉 does not characterise m and neither does the pair 〈a, d〉.
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for all x, y : c(x, y) → m(x,y),
should be made with respect to the point and function of m and also to the accepted rules Intro m, Intro not −m, and
Elim.
Similarly, for consequences, the situation can be that there is d(x, y) (not implied by the consequent in Elim m)
such that a rule
for all x, y : m(x,y) → d(x, y),
can be acknowledged, once more with respect to the point and function of m and to the accepted rules Intro m, Intro
not −m, and Elim.9
2. The formal framework
2.1. Introduction
As stated in Section 1.1 above, we distinguish between the abstract level of formal analysis (to be dealt with in the
present section), where an algebraic framework is developed, and the level of applications where the abstract theory
is used as a tool for analysing different conceptual structures (Section 3).
At the abstract algebraic level, the notion “intermediary” will not be used. In the algebraic theory, however, a
technical notion “intervenient” will be defined. In Section 3, the notion “intervenient” will be used as a tool for
analysis of what, informally, is called “intermediaries”. More precisely, in Section 3, we will distinguish different
types of intermediaries and indicate how intermediaries can be interrelated.
The algebraic theory contains a number of definitions of technical terms. Before going into this theory, it is appro-
priate briefly to suggest how the algebraic theory can be used for analysing a normative system with intermediaries.
Definition 1. S = 〈B,∧,′ , ρ〉 is a supplemented Boolean algebra (sBa) if 〈B,∧,′ 〉 is a Boolean algebra, ρ is a binary
relation on B and the partial ordering determined by the Boolean algebra 〈B,∧,′ 〉 is a subset of ρ.
If aρb and bρa, we say that a and b are ρ-similar.
An application can be that S is a normative system expressed in terms of a set of conditions B and a relation ρ
such that, for a, b ∈ B , aρb holds if and only if a implies b in the normative system S .
Next, let 〈B1,∧,′ ρ/B1〉 and 〈B2,∧,′ , ρ/B2〉 be two substructures of 〈B,∧,′ , ρ〉. Let B1 and B2 be disjoint, except
for the zero and unit constants ⊥ and 
. In the application where S is a normative system, we can think of B1 as a set
of descriptive conditions and B2 as a set of normative conditions. If B is a set of conditions, ⊥ stands for the absurd
condition and 
 for the trivial condition.
Of special interest is where B contains a subset M , disjoint from B1 ∪ B2, where, for m ∈ M , there is a ∈ B1 and
b ∈ B2 such that aρm and mρb. In this case, given certain further requirements, m will be called an “intervenient”.
In the application where S is a normative system, we can conceive of a case where a condition m belongs neither
to the set B1 of descriptive conditions nor to the set B2 of normative conditions but where, in S , m is implied by a
descriptive condition and implies a normative condition.
9 In the present paper we have in view only concepts where there is at least some ground- and consequence-specification a1(x, y) →
m(x,y) & m(x,y) → a2(x, y). It should be noted, however, that, in the law as well as in moral discourse, also there are concepts that are not
even partially ground- and consequence-specified in this way. If there are at all “introduction rules” for such concepts, they may have the form of
guidelines for decision making taking into account a set F of factors; similarly for the elimination rules.
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2.2.1. Boolean quasi-orderings
One formal structure that will be used in our investigation of how subsystems of different kinds are linked is that
of a Boolean quasi-ordering (Bqo).10
Definition 2. The relational structure 〈B,∧,′ ,R〉 is a Boolean quasi-ordering (Bqo) if 〈B,∧,′ 〉 is a Boolean algebra
and R is a binary, reflexive and transitive relation on B (i.e. R is a quasi-ordering), ⊥ is the zero element and 
 is
the unit element such that R satisfies the additional requirements:
(1) aRb and aRc implies aR(b ∧ c),
(2) aRb implies b′Ra′,
(3) (a ∧ b)Ra,
(4) not 
R⊥.
(Requirement (4) excludes the possibility that R = B1 ×B2, which holds for inconsistent systems.)
The indifference part of R is denoted Q and is defined by: aQb if and only if aRb and bRa. Similarly, the strict
part of R is denoted S and is defined by: aSb if and only if aRb and not bRa. (For a Bqo Bi = 〈Bi,∧,′ ,Ri〉, the
corresponding indifference relation and strong relation is denoted by Qi and Si , respectively.) Note that if an sBa
〈B,∧,′ , ρ〉 is a Bqo, we often prefer to use R instead of ρ to denote the quasi-ordering in the sBa.
Note that the definitions of least upper bound (lub) and greatest lower bound (glb) for partial orderings are easily
extended to quasi-orderings, but, in the case of a quasi-ordering, the lub or the glb of a set of objects is not necessarily
unique; i.e., there can be several.
A Boolean algebra 〈B,∧,′ 〉 is said to be complete if infA (or supA) exists for all subsets A of B , where  is
the partial ordering determined by the Boolean algebra 〈B,∧,′ 〉. The idea of completeness applied to Bqo’s gives rise
to a number of different notions (see [30]). We here restrict ourself to only one of these, viz. order completeness.
Definition 3. A Bqo 〈B,∧,′ ,R〉 is order complete if lubRA =∅ and glbRA =∅ for all A ⊆ B .
2.2.2. Narrowness and minimal elements
The narrowness-relation determined by the quasi-orderings 〈B1,R1〉 and 〈B2,R2〉 is the binary relation  on
B1 ×B2 such that 〈a1, a2〉 〈b1, b2〉 if and only if b1R1a1 and a2R2b2.
We note that  is a quasi-ordering. We let  denote the equality part of  and  the strict part of . The equality
part  is an equivalence relation and we denote the equivalence class determined by 〈b1, b2〉 ∈ B1 ×B2 as [b1, b2].
(The sign  should be written as a subscript. The reason why this is not done is typographical.)
The pair 〈a1, a2〉 is a minimal element in X ⊆ B1 × B2, with respect to 〈B1,R1〉 and 〈B2,R2〉, if and only if there
is no 〈x1, x2〉 ∈ X such that 〈x1, x2〉 〈a1, a2〉.
The set of minimal elements in X is denoted minR2R1 X. When there is no risk of ambiguity we write just minX.
2.2.3. Boolean joining systems (Bjs)
Another important structure is that of a Boolean joining-system (Bjs) (see [29]).
Definition 4. A Boolean joining-system (Bjs) is an ordered triple 〈B1,B2, J 〉 such that B1 = 〈B1,∧,′ ,R1〉 and B2 =
〈B2,∧,′ ,R2〉 are Bqo’s and J ⊆ B1 ×B2, and three specific requirements are satisfied:
(1) for all b1, c1 ∈ B1 and b2, c2 ∈ B2, 〈b1, b2〉 ∈ J and 〈b1, b2〉 〈c1, c2〉 implies 〈c1, c2〉 ∈ J ,
10 Technical concepts related to Bqo’s, defined in previous papers are: fragments of Bqo’s, and joinings of elements of Bqo’s. For a more compre-
hensive account of the theory of Bqo’s and related notions, the reader is referred to [23]. A short recapitulation of some definitions is as follows.
If B = 〈B,∧,′ ,R〉 is a Bqo, and 〈Bi,∧,′ 〉 is a subalgebra of 〈B,∧,′ 〉, and Ri = R|Bi , then the structure Bi = 〈Bi,∧,′ ,Ri 〉 is a fragment of B.
Let B,B1,B2 be Bqo’s such that B1 and B2 are fragments of B. A joining from B1 to B2 in B is a pair 〈b1, b2〉 in B such that b1 ∈ B1, b2 ∈ B2,
b1Rb2, not b1R⊥ and not 
Rb2.
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(3) for any C2 ⊆ B2 and b1 ∈ B1, if 〈b1, c2〉 ∈ J for all c2 ∈ C2, then 〈b1, a2〉 ∈ J for all a2 ∈ glbR2C2.
The definition allows that J = ∅; in this case the Bjs is said to be improper.11
If 〈B1,B2, J 〉 is a Boolean joining-system, the elements of J are called joinings, and J is called the joining-space
from B1 to B2 in 〈B1,B2, J 〉.
In this paper, we assume:
(∗) In a Bjs 〈B1,B2, J 〉, the relation J is such that if 〈b1,⊥〉 ∈ J , then it holds that b1Q1⊥, and if 〈
, b2〉 ∈ J , then
it holds that b2Q2
.
If S is a comprehensive normative system (for example the French Code Civil) where S is represented by an
sBa 〈B,∧,′ , ρ〉, interest is often directed to substructures of S . When investigating the formal structure of such a
substructure of S , it is often useful to study Bjs’s which lie within 〈B,∧,′ , ρ〉 (see Section 2.2.8), for example a Bjs
〈B1,B2, J 〉 where B1 = 〈B1,∧,′ ,R1〉 consists of descriptive conditions and B2 = 〈B2,∧,′ ,R2〉 consists of normative
conditions. Thus while the domain of 〈B,∧,′ , ρ〉 contains conditions of different sorts, the domain of each of B1 and
B2 in 〈B1,B2, J 〉 contains conditions of the same sort.
A special question is why B1 and B2 in 〈B1,B2, J 〉 are supposed to be Bqo’s 〈B1,∧,′ ,R1〉, 〈B2,∧,′ ,R2〉, instead
of mere Boolean algebras 〈B1,∧,′ 〉, 〈B2,∧,′ 〉. The reason is that, if B = 〈B,∧,′ ,R〉 is a Bqo, we regard the partial
ordering  determined by 〈B,∧,′ 〉 as representing the purely logical relationships between conditions in B , while R
also represents implications that hold for other reasons. Thus, for example, due to stipulative definitions, there can be
analytical relationships between two descriptive conditions a and b, or between two normative conditions a and b.
Such relationships are not expressed by a 1 b, a 2 b, but they can be expressed by aR1b or aR2b, respectively. (We
note that 1 is a subset of R1 and 2 is a subset of R2.)
2.2.4. Connectivity
A Bjs 〈B1,B2, J 〉 satisfies connectivity if whenever 〈c1, c2〉 ∈ J there is 〈b1, b2〉 ∈ J such that 〈b1, b2〉 is a minimal
element in 〈B1,B2, J 〉 and 〈b1, b2〉 〈c1, c2〉.12
Suppose that 〈B1,B2, J 〉 is a Bjs that satisfies connectivity. Then
J = {〈b1, b2〉 ∈ B1 ×B2:
(∃〈a1, a2〉 ∈ minJ : 〈a1, a2〉 〈b1, b2〉
)}
.
If we use the notion of an image of a set under a relation, then we can say that J is the image of minJ under .
It is easy to see that if 〈B1,B2, J1〉 and 〈B1,B2, J2〉 are Bjs which satisfy connectivity and minJ1 = minJ2, then
J1 = J2. Note that if we “substantially reduce” minJ , then the image of the new set under  is not J . To be more
precise: Suppose that 〈a1, a2〉 ∈ minJ and K ⊂ minJ such that if 〈a1, a2〉  〈b1, b2〉 then 〈b1, b2〉 /∈ K . Then it
follows that the image of K under  is a proper subset of J .
If, in a Bjs 〈B1,B2, J 〉, B1 and B2 are order complete, then 〈B1,B2, J 〉 satisfies connectivity (see [28], for a proof).
2.2.5. Generating of joining-spaces
We note that if B1 and B2 are Bqo’s and
J = {J ⊆ B1 ×B2 | 〈B1,B2, J 〉 is a Bjs
}
,
then J is a closure system.13 J is the family of all joining-spaces from B1 to B2. If K ⊆ B1 ×B2 let
[K]J =
⋂
{J | J ∈ J , J ⊇ K}.
[K]J is the joining-space over B1 and B2 generated by K . If J is the joining-space from B1 to B2 generated by K
but J is not generated by any proper subset of K , then we say that J is non-redundantly generated by K .
11 Note that if B is a Bqo and B1 and B2 are fragments of B and J = {〈b1, b2〉 ∈ B1 × B2|b1Rb2} then, given some general assumptions,
〈B1,B2, J 〉 is a Bjs.
12 In the theory of Bqo’s developed in Section 5.1 of [23], minimal joinings between two fragments of a Bqo are called “connections”.
13 For definition and results of closure systems, see for example [10, pp. 23 f.].
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Note that if 〈B1,B2 J 〉 is a Bjs and J is generated by K and for all 〈a1, a2〉 ∈ K there is there is 〈b1, b2〉 in minK
such that 〈b1, b2〉  〈a1, a2〉, then J is also generated by minK . If 〈B1,B2, J 〉 is a Bjs and J is non-redundantly
generated by K and K ⊆ minJ , then K is called a base for J in 〈B1,B2, J 〉.
Suppose that K,L ⊆ B1 × B2 and that K is the set of -equivalence classes defined by the elements in K
and L is the set of -equivalence classes defined by the elements in L. If there is a bijection ϕ between K
and L such that ϕ(x) = y iff there is 〈a1, a2〉, 〈b1, b2〉 ∈ B1 × B2 such that 〈b1, b2〉 ∈ x and 〈a1, a2〉 ∈ y and
〈a1, a2〉 〈b1, b2〉 then we say that K and L are -counterparts.
If K and L are -counterparts, then the image of K under  is the same as the image of L under , and the sets
of joinings generated by K and L are the same.
If for a base K for J in 〈B1,B2, J 〉, K and L are -counterparts, then we say that L up to -equivalence is a base
for J in 〈B1,B2, J 〉.
2.2.7. Couplings and pair couplings
If 〈B1,B2, J 〉 is a Bjs satisfying connectivity and the number of -equivalence classes defined by the elements in
minJ is exactly one, then the elements in minJ are called couplings. If the number of equivalence classes defined
by the elements in minJ is exactly two, then sets consisting of one element from each equivalence class is called
a pair coupling. Thus if [b1, b2]  is the only equivalence class, any 〈a1, a2〉 ∈ J “encompasses” every element of
[b1, b2] ; similarly, if [b1, b2]  and [c1, c2]  are the only equivalence classes, any 〈a1, a2〉 ∈ J “encompasses”
every element of [b1, b2] or every element of [c1, c2].14
2.2.8. Lie within
If S = 〈B,∧,′ , ρ〉 is an sBa and B1,B2 ⊆ B , we say that B1 and B2 do not overlap if B1 ∩B2 ⊆ {
,⊥}.
A Bqo Bi = 〈Bi,∧,′ ,Ri〉 lies within an sBa 〈B,∧,′ , ρ〉 if 〈Bi,∧,′ 〉 is a subalgebra of 〈B,∧,′ 〉 and ρ|Bi = Ri .
A Bjs 〈B1,B2, J 〉 lies within an sBa S = 〈B,∧,′ , ρ〉 if B1 and B2 lie within B, B1 and B2 do not overlap and
ρ|(B1 ×B2) = J .
We note that if a Bjs 〈B1,B2, J 〉 lies within an sBa S = 〈B,∧,′ , ρ〉, then, for i ∈ {1,2}, 〈Bi,∧,′ , ρ|Bi〉 is a Bqo
where ρ|Bi = Ri .
2.2.9. “More or less extensive” sBa’s
An sBa can be more or less extensive. In many cases we consider an sBa S = 〈B,∧,′ , ρ〉 such that there are a
number of Bqo’s Bi = 〈Bi,∧,′ ,Ri〉, i ∈ I , lying within S and for every i, j ∈ I , there is Ji,j such that 〈Bi ,Bj , Ji,j 〉
is a Bjs lying within S . But it is also possible that, in an sBa 〈B,∧,′ , ρ〉, ρ is rather thin. Given a thin ρ we are often
interested in enlarging ρ to ρ∗ by, from subsets of ρ, generating Bqo’s and Bjs’s which will lie within ρ∗. One reason
for this is that, when it comes to applications of the representation of a normative system, a first, crude representation
of a such a system often takes the form of an sBa 〈B,∧,′ , ρ〉 where ρ is rather thin, but in the process of a rational
reconstruction of the normative system we obtain (by generating Bqo’s and Bjs’s) successively more extended relations
ρ∗ on the Boolean algebra 〈B,∧,′ 〉. Note that the Boolean algebra 〈B,∧,′ 〉 can be regarded as the “language” of the
representation of the normative system.
2.3. Intervenients
2.3.1. Definitions and first remarks
As stated in the introduction, legal intermediaries such as “ownership” or “contract” serve as links from descriptive
conditions (grounds) to normative conditions (consequences). The notion of “intervenient” is used as a tool for analysis
of what, informally, we call “intermediaries”. Thus intervenients can serve to connect conditions of different sorts.
As a preliminary, we first introduce a notion of “weakest ground” and “strongest consequence”. Then, we define
the notion of “intervenient”.
If S = 〈B,∧,′ , ρ〉 is an sBa and 〈B1,B2, J 〉 is a Bjs lying within S and m ∈ B\ (B1 ∪B2), we say that
14 In [23], the notions of coupling and pair coupling were defined within a different framework. The basic idea of coupling and pair coupling in
that essay, however, is the same as that behind the present definition.
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1. a1 ∈ B1 is one of the weakest grounds in B1 of m with respect to S if a1ρm, and it holds that, if there is b1 ∈ B1
such that b1ρm, then b1ρa1. A weakest ground a1 of m is degenerated if a1ρ⊥.
2. a2 ∈ B2 is one of the strongest consequences of m in B2 with respect to S if mρa2, and it holds that, if there is
b2 ∈ B2 such that mρb2, then a2ρb2. A strongest consequence a2 of m is degenerated if 
ρa2.
Definition 5. Suppose that S = 〈B,∧,′ , ρ〉 is an sBa and 〈B1,B2, J 〉 is a Bjs lying within S and m ∈ B\ (B1 ∪ B2).
Then m is an intervenient from B1 to B2 in S if there is 〈a1, a2〉 ∈ ρ such that a1 is a non-degenerated weakest ground
in B1 of m with respect to S and a2 is a non-degenerated strongest consequence in B2 of m with respect to S . We say
that the intervenient m corresponds to the pair 〈a1, a2〉 in B1 ×B2 (see Fig. 1).
Note that if a1, b1 ∈ B1 are weakest grounds in B1 of m with respect to S , then a1Q1b1; analogously for strongest
consequences. If m corresponds to the pairs 〈a1, a2〉 and 〈b1, b2〉, then a1Q1b1 and a2Q2b2.
We note that in a Bjs 〈B1,B2, J 〉 an intervenient m can be used for “inferring” joinings from B1 to B2, as appears
from the following proposition.
Proposition 6. Suppose that the Bjs 〈B,∧,′ , J 〉 lies within the sBa S = 〈B,∧,′ , ρ〉 where ρ is transitive, and that
m ∈ B\(B1 ∪B2) is an intervenient from B1 to B2 in B corresponding to 〈a1, a2〉. Then 〈a1, a2〉 〈b1, b2〉 if and only
if b1ρmρb2. (Proof omitted.)
The following proposition elucidates the function of intervenients as tools for the analysis of intermediaries and
the representation of normative systems.
Proposition 7. Suppose that
1. 〈B1,B3, J1,3〉 and 〈B3,B2, J3,2〉, 〈B1,B2, J1,2〉 are Bjs’s lying within the sBa S = 〈B,∧,′ , ρ〉 where ρ is transi-
tive,
2. B1 and B2 are order complete.
Then, if m ∈ B3, and there are b1 ∈ B1 and b2 ∈ B2 such that (i) ⊥S1b1, b2S2
, and (ii) b1J1,3m and mJ3,2b2, it
follows that m is an intervenient from B1 to B2 in S . (Proof omitted.)
2.3.2. Base of intervenients
Let S = 〈B,∧,′ , ρ〉 be an sBa, where B1,B2 ⊆ B , B1 and B2 are non-overlapping, and, for 1  i  2, Bi =
〈Bi,∧,′ ,Ri〉 is a Bqo and where Ri = ρ|Bi . Let M ⊆ B and M ∩ (B1 ∪B2) =∅. We say that M produces the set
K = {〈b1, b2〉 ∈ B1 ×B2 | ∃m ∈ M: b1ρmρb2
}
.
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The set of joinings corresponding to a set of intervenients M from B1 to B2 is denoted CM where
CM = {〈b1, b2〉 ∈ B1 ×B2 | ∃m ∈ M: m corresponds to 〈b1, b2〉
}
.
Recalling the notion “base for a joining-space” (see above Section 2.2.6), we define the notion “base of interve-
nients” for a joining-space:
Definition 8. Suppose that 〈B1,B2, J 〉 is a Bjs lying within the sBa S = 〈B,∧,′ , ρ〉. If M is a set of intervenients
such that CM is a base for J , we say that M is a base of intervenients for J .
2.3.3. Extendable and non-extendable intervenients
In this subsection, we define a number of important notions. Throughout in the subsection, we consider two Bjs’s
〈B1,B2, J0〉, 〈B1,B2, J1〉 lying within two coherent (see below) sBa’s S0 = 〈B,∧,′ , ρ0〉 and S1 = 〈B,∧,′ , ρ1〉, re-
spectively, on the Boolean algebra 〈B,∧,′ 〉, where m is an intervenient from B1 to B2 in S0 and in S1.
The coherence requirement on an sBa S = 〈B,∧,′ , ρ〉 is:
(∗∗) (1) There is no element c1 ∈ B1 such that c1ρm and c1ρm′ and ⊥S1c1, (2) there is no element c2 ∈ B2 such that
mρc2 and m′ρc2 and c2S2
.15
We say that m is stronger in S1 than in S0 if there are a1, a2, b1, b2 ∈ B such that 〈a1, a2〉 corresponds to m in S1
and 〈b1, b2〉 corresponds to m in S0 and 〈a1, a2〉 〈b1, b2〉.
When (going from ρ0 to ρ1) an intervenient m is strengthened, there is a change of the weakest ground for and/or
the strongest consequence of m. We thus strengthen an intervenient by narrowing the corresponding joining and
thereby extending the relation supplementing the Boolean algebra.
Note that the change from ρ0 to ρ1 can occur even if a Bjs 〈B1,B2, J 〉 lies within both of S0 and S1, provided that
the joining 〈a1, a2〉 corresponding to m in 〈B1,B2, J 〉 is not minimal. In this situation, the strengthening of m does
not imply a change of the Bjs 〈B1,B2, J 〉.
Note that an intervenient can be stronger in one supplemented algebra than in another either on “the ground side”,
“the consequence side” or on both. Formally this can be described in the following way. Suppose m corresponds to
〈a1, a2〉 in S0 and to 〈b1, b2〉 in S1.
m is ground-stronger in S1 than in S0 if a1S1b1 and b2R2a2.
m is consequence-stronger in S1 than in S0 if a1R1b1 and b2S2a2.
Note that from the definitions it follows that m is stronger in S1 than in S0 if it is ground-stronger in S1 than in S0
or consequence-stronger in S1 than in S0.16
Next, we define notions of “extendable”. We say that:
m is ground-extendable in S0 if there is an sBa S1 = 〈B,∧,′ , ρ1〉 such that m is ground-stronger in S1 than in S0
and such that ρ0 ⊆ ρ1,
m is consequence-extendable in S0 if there is an sBa S1 = 〈B,∧,′ , ρ1〉 such that m is consequence-stronger in S1
than in S0 and such that ρ0 ⊆ ρ1,
m is extendable in S0 if there is an sBa S1 such that m is stronger in S1 than in S0 and such that ρ0 ⊆ ρ1.
The accretion class for m relative to S0 is the set of Si = 〈B,∧,′ , ρi〉 such that m is stronger in Si than in S0 and
such that ρ0 ⊆ ρi .
15 Observe that while S (calligraphic) is an sBa, Si (italics) is the strict order corresponding to Ri .
16 Observe that in the Bjs 〈B1,B2, J 〉, B1 = 〈B1,∧,′ ,R1〉 and B2 = 〈B2,∧,′ ,R2〉; furthermore observe that S1, S2 are the strict orderings
corresponding to R1,R2, respectively.
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For the present subsection we presuppose that,
1. 〈B1,B2, J 〉 is a Bjs lying within an sBa S = 〈B,∧,′ , ρ〉, where ρ is transitive,
2. 〈B1,B2, J 〉 satisfies connectivity (see Section 2.2.4 above),
3. the coherence requirement (**) on S is fulfilled (see Section 2.3.3) and,
4. m is an intervenient from B1 to B2 in S .
Given the presuppositions it is possible but not necessary that m′ is an intervenient from B1 to B2 in S . Let us first
consider the case where both m and m′ are intervenients.
Situation 1: Both m and m′ are intervenients.
Proposition 9. If m,m′ are intervenients in S = 〈B,∧,′ , ρ〉 such that m corresponds to 〈a1, a2〉 and m′ corresponds
to 〈b1, b2〉, it follows that 〈a′1, a′2〉 〈b1, b2〉.
Proof. If m corresponds to 〈a1, a2〉 and m′ corresponds to 〈b1, b2〉, then a1 ∧b1ρm and a1 ∧b1ρm′. If this is the case,
from the coherence requirement (**) it follows that a1 ∧ b1Q1⊥. For if this does not hold, then there is an element c1
such that ⊥S1c1 and c1ρm and c1ρm′. The coherence requirement (**) will also lead to a2 ∨ b2Q2
, otherwise there
is an element c2 in B2 such that c2S2
 and mρc2 and m′ρc2. Hence a1 ∧ b1Q1⊥ and a2 ∨ b2Q2
. From this follows
that b1R1a′1 and a′2R2b2, i.e. that 〈a′1, a′2〉 〈b1, b2〉. 
Proposition 10. Given the presuppositions in Proposition 9 and that 〈a1, a2〉 ∈ minJ and 〈b′1, b′2〉 ∈ J , it follows that
a′1Q1b1 and a′2Q2b2.






Propositions 9 and 10 state delimitations (in different circumstances) of the joinings that m′ can correspond to,
given the joining that m corresponds to.
Proposition 11. If 〈a1, a2〉, 〈a′1, a′2〉 ∈ J , then 〈a1, a2〉, 〈a′1, a′2〉 ∈ minJ .
Proof. First, we suppose that 〈a1, a2〉, 〈a′1, a′2〉 ∈ J and prove that 〈a1, a2〉 ∈ minJ . Suppose that 〈b1, b2〉 ∈ J and〈b1, b2〉 〈a1, a2〉. Then b2R2a2 and b1 ∧ a′1R1b1 and b1 ∧ a′1Ra′1. Hence, 〈b1 ∧ a′1, a2〉 ∈ J and 〈b1 ∧ a′1, a′2〉 ∈ J .
From condition (3) in the definition of a Bjs, it follows that 〈b1 ∧ a′1, a2 ∧ a′2〉 ∈ J , i.e. 〈b1 ∧ a′1,⊥〉 ∈ J . Thus,
b1 ∧ a′1R1⊥. (See the assumption (∗) in Section 2.2.3.) This implies that b1 ∨ a1R1a1 and hence b1R1a1. Since
a1R1b1 it follows that a1Q1b1.
Note that 〈b1, b2 ∨ a′2〉 ∈ J and 〈a′1, b2 ∨ a′2〉 ∈ J . Hence, 〈b1 ∨ a′1, b2 ∨ a′2〉 ∈ J according to condition (2) in the
definition of a Bjs. Since a1Q1b1 it follows that 〈
, b2 ∨ a′2〉 ∈ J , which implies that 
R2b2 ∨ a′2. (Once more, see
the assumption (∗).) From this follows that a2R2b2 ∧ a2 which implies a2R2b2. Since b2R2a2 it follows that a2Q2b2.
We have thus shown that 〈a1, a2〉  〈b1, b2〉. Since 〈B1,B2, J 〉 satisfies connectivity this implies that 〈a1, a2〉 ∈
minJ .
Next, from what has now been proved it follows similarly that if 〈a′1, a′2〉, 〈a1, a2〉 ∈ J , then 〈a′1, a′2〉 ∈ minJ . 
Propositions 9 and 11 have an interesting consequence.
Proposition 12. Suppose that m is an intervenient in S corresponding to 〈a1, a2〉, that m′ is an intervenient in S
corresponding to 〈b1, b2〉, and that 〈a′1, a′2〉, 〈b′1, b′2〉 ∈ J . Then a′1Q1b1 and a′2Q2b2.
Proof. According to Proposition 11, 〈a1, a2〉 ∈ minJ . From Proposition 10 then follows that a′1Q1b1 and a′2Q2b2.
(Note that ρ ∩B1 ×B2 = J .) 
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From m being an intervenient in an sBa S = 〈B,∧,′ , ρ〉 it does not follow that m′ is so. If m is an intervenient in
S = 〈B,∧,′ , ρ〉 but m′ is not, it may be possible to extend ρ to ρ1 so that m′ is an intervenient in S1 = 〈B,∧,′ , ρ1〉.17
We distinguish between the following two cases. (The presuppositions stated at the beginning of the subsection are
assumed.)
1. There is 〈b1, b2〉 ∈ ρ such that if we extend ρ to ρ1 only by 〈b1,m′〉 and 〈m′, b2〉 and form the resulting transitive
closure, then m′ is an intervenient from B1 to B2 in S1. In this case, the set J of joinings from B1 to B2 is not
changed by the pairs 〈b1,m′〉, 〈m′, b2〉 ∈ ρ1.
2. Case 1 is not at hand. Let ρ1 be an extension of ρ such that 〈b1, b2〉, 〈b1,m′〉, 〈m′, b2〉 ∈ ρ1. Under general
conditions, m′ is an intervenient from B1 to B2 in S1 and m′ corresponds to 〈b1, b2〉 ∈ ρ1. In this case, the set J
of joinings from B1 to B2 is changed to a set K where 〈b1, b2〉 is among the members.
2.3.5. gic-systems and proto-intervenients
In preceding sections, we have analysed intervenients between two sets (from a set of grounds to a set of con-
sequences) in an sBa S = 〈B,∧,′ , ρ〉. We will now change the perspective and investigate how a set M of “proto-
intervenients” can be used for constructing an sBa. The formal tool to be used is the notion of a gic-system (gic for
“ground–intervenient–consequence”).
Definition 13. Suppose that 〈B,∧,′ 〉 is a Boolean algebra such that B1,B2 ⊆ B do not overlap and 〈B1,∧,′ 〉 and
〈B2,∧,′ 〉 are subalgebras of 〈B,∧,′ 〉. Let B1 = 〈B1,∧,′ ,R1〉 and B2 = 〈B2,∧,′ ,R2〉 be Bqo’s and M ⊆ B such that
M ∩ (B1 ∪B2) = ∅. Then a gic-system is a triple 〈B1,M,B2〉 such that M is a function M :M −→ B1 ×B2.
Thus, in a gic-system, to each m ∈ M is assigned an element 〈a1, a2〉 ∈ B1 × B2. A triple 〈m, 〈a1, a2〉〉 is called a
proto-intervenient where a1 is the ground and a2 is the consequence of m. Note that the set
{〈a1, a2〉 ∈ B1 ×B2 |M(m) = 〈a1, a2〉 for some m ∈ M
}
is the image of M under M and we denote it M[M].
A gic-system 〈B1,M,B2〉 determines a Bjs 〈B1,B2, J 〉 where J is the joining space from B1 to B2 generated by
M[M]. Obviously, there is an sBa S = 〈B,∧,′ , ρ〉 such that 〈B1,B2, J 〉 lies within S and such that the elements in
M are intervenients from B1 to B2 in S .
In many contexts, it is desirable to choose M such that M is a base of intervenients for J (see Subsection 2.3.2).
The idea of how to strengthen intervenients (see Section 2.3.3) can be applied analogously to proto-intervenients.
2.3.6. Different types of intervenients
The formal theory developed in previous subsections provides tools for distinguishing different types of interve-
nients. As will appear subsequently, in Section 3, these distinctions have a bearing on the analysis of intermediaries.
(In Section 3, we will return to Dummett’s example and a number of legal examples.)
Suppose that 〈B1,B2, J 〉 is a Bjs lying within an sBa S = 〈B,∧,′ , ρ〉 and that m is an intervenient from B1 to B2
in S corresponding to 〈a1, a2〉. One division (I) of types of m is based on the kind of joining 〈a1, a2〉 represents in
〈B1,B2, J 〉. First we distinguish between the case that 〈a1, a2〉 is or is not, respectively, an element of minJ . Next,
we distinguish between subcases where 〈a1, a2〉 is an element of minJ , namely that 〈a1, a2〉 is a (pair) coupling or
not. (Cf. Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.7.) By this division, we obtain three types of intervenients:
1. m corresponds to a mere joining 〈a1, a2〉,
2. m corresponds to a mere minimal joining 〈a1, a2〉,
3. m corresponds to a pair coupling or coupling 〈a1, a2〉.
17 Note that while in Section 2.3.3 we discussed the extending of intervenients, what is in view now is the extending of relation ρ.
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distinguish between the cases where m′ is an intervenient or not. Next we distinguish between subcases where m′ is an
intervenient, namely where m′ corresponds to 〈a′1, a′2〉 or not. This basis, once more, gives three types of intervenients
m:
1. negation m′ of m is an intervenient corresponding to 〈a′1, a′2〉,
2. negation m′ of m is an intervenient but not corresponding to 〈a′1, a′2〉,
3. negation m′ of m is not an intervenient.
A third division (III) is based on whether m is extendable or not. (Cf Section 2.3.3.) We obtain four types:
1. m is ground-extendable and consequence-extendable,
2. m is ground-extendable but not consequence-extendable,
3. m is not ground-extendable but consequence-extendable,
4. m is not extendable.
As appears from previous subsections, divisions (I)–(III) are not independent of each other. For example, if m
corresponds to a mere joining 〈a1, a2〉 (division (I), case 1), then, if the coherence requirement (**) is presupposed
(see above, Section 2.3.3), it is excluded that m′ is an intervenient corresponding, up to Q-similarity, to 〈a′1, a′2〉
(division (II) case 1). Other examples of the use of the above typology will appear in Section 3.
3. Applications
3.1. Introduction: cis models, intervenients and intermediaries
The notion of intermediary is not conceived of in such a way that from the assumption that m is an intervenient in
S it follows that m is an intermediary in S (cf. Section 1.4). We believe that the status of m as an intermediary cannot
be wholly inferred from properties described in the abstract formal theory of Section 2 above.
On the other hand, in the applications to be discussed in the present main section, we have a number of concepts
that are intermediaries. For the analysis of these intermediaries, the abstract theory of intervenients is (or so we claim)
a forceful tool. This tool will be used here by way of a model of the abstract framework in Section 2. This model is
the model of condition implication structure (cis).
In the abstract theory of the preceding section, different structures were introduced, namely such where a struc-
ture is:
1. an sBa B = 〈B,∧,′ , ρ〉,
2. a Bqo B = 〈B,∧,′ ,R〉,
3. a Bjs S = 〈B1,B2, J 〉.
If T is any of 1–3, a cis model of T is obtained if B , B1,B2, respectively, are domains of conditions, and
aρb, aRb,aJb, respectively, represents that a implies b.
Treating conditions as objects provides a convenient way of introducing relations between conditions. Thus we
may say, e.g. that according to some normative system, condition a is a ground for condition b. For example, it can be
the case that, according to a particular regulation, not having a medical degree is a ground for not getting a license as
a physician. Saying this is tantamount to saying that according to this regulation, a particular relation ρ holds between
two conditions a and b. Or consider the statement: “if x is a child of y, then x is entitled to inherit y”. Let us suppose
that a is the binary condition “to be a child of”, b is the binary condition “to be entitled to inherit” and that ρ represents
the implicative relation. Then, in the example, we represent the original statement by aρb (or 〈a, b〉 ∈ ρ) without loss
of information.18
18 For a more comprehensive treatment of conditions, see [21,31].
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As stated in the introduction, the cis-model is only one of several possible models of the abstract algebraic theory.
The cis-model permits a detailed study of a number of issues pertaining especially to intermediate concepts in a legal
system.
As appears from the definition of “intervenient” in Section 2.3.1, an intervenient is represented as corresponding
to an ordered pair 〈a1, a2〉. Similarly, as stated in Section 1.4, an intermediary m between two kinds K1 and K2 is
represented by an ordered pair 〈a1, a2〉, where a1 is the antecedent in Intro and a2 is the consequent in Elim. Therefore,
typologies for intervenients can be used as typologies for intermediaries as well. This feature is taken into account in
the applications to be discussed in the subsequent subsections.
3.2. Dummett’s “Boche” example once more
In our formal framework, Dummett’s Boche example can be represented as follows (cf. Section 1.3). Let S be a cis
model of the sBa 〈B,∧,′ , ρ〉, and let 〈B1,B2, J 〉 be a Bjs which lies within S . The set B1 contains conditions express-
ing different nationalities and B2 conditions expressing different psychological dispositions. Let B(1) be B extended
with the condition Boche and ρ(1) an extension of ρ such that Boche is an intervenient in S(1) = 〈B(1),∧,′ , ρ(1)〉
from B1 to B2. In the Bjs 〈B1,B2, J (1)〉 lying within S(1), J (1) is the extension of J as an effect of the extension of ρ
to ρ(1).
Suppose that the pair 〈a1, a2〉 is a joining in 〈B1,B2, J (1)〉 but not a joining in 〈B1,B2, J 〉, and that the intervenient
Boche corresponds to the joining 〈a1, a2〉 in 〈B1,B2, J (1)〉.19 Then the step from S to S(1) would correspond to a
non-conservative extension in the sense stated by Dummett that “certain statements which did not contain the term
were inferable from other statements not containing it which were not previously inferable” (see above Section 1.3).
Next, the question arises whether, in S(1), 〈a1, a2〉 is a mere joining or a minimal joining, perhaps a coupling or
pair coupling. Dummett’s example can be conceived of in such a way that 〈a1, a2〉 is a minimal joining, perhaps
even a coupling or pair coupling. On the other hand, we can elaborate further on Dummett’s example by making an
extension of the system S(1) to a system S(2) = 〈B(2),∧,′ , ρ(2)〉 by adding the intervenient Berserk corresponding to
the joining 〈b1, a2〉 in 〈B1,B2, J (2)〉. (We can assume that b1 is the condition to be of Swedish nationality.) In S(2)
Boche corresponds to a mere joining, since 〈c1, a2〉 = 〈a1 ∨ b1, a2〉 is a minimal joining in J (2) while 〈a1, a2〉 is a
mere joining. (See Fig. 2.)
We note that since 〈a1, a2〉 is not a minimal joining in S(2), S(2) does not contain the norm a′1ρ(2)a′2, since this is
incompatible with b1ρ(2)a2, which says that a1 is not the only condition implying a2. (See Section 2.3.4 above.) So,
not-Boche cannot be an intervenient corresponding to 〈a′1, a′2〉 in S(2).
19 We note that, in the example, though B is extended to B(1) , ρ to ρ(1) , and J to J (1) , by the introduction of the intermediary, we assume that
B1,B2 are the same in the Bjs’s 〈B1,B2, J 〉 and 〈B1,B2, J (1)〉.
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3.3. Minimal joining and modes for acquiring ownership
Next, we give a simplified legal example concerning modes for ownership acquisition. The legal system we study
is represented by the sBa S = 〈B,∧,′ , ρ〉. The legal rules of ownership in S are, so we suppose, expressed in terms
of a set M ⊆ B of conditions that are intermediaries: purchase m1, inheritance m2, occupation m3, specification m4,
ownership m5. B1 is a subset of B containing, among others, the following conditions: a1 (making a contract etc.),
b1 (having particular kinship relationship), c1 (appropriating something not owned), d1 (creating a valuable thing out
of worthless material). The weakest grounds in B1 of the conditions in M with respect to 〈B,∧,′ , ρ〉 are described
by the following set G of ordered pairs: 〈a1,m1〉, 〈b1,m2〉, 〈c1,m3〉, 〈d1,m4〉, 〈a1 ∨ b1 ∨ c1 ∨ d1,m5〉. The strongest
consequences in B2 ⊆ B of the conditions in M with respect to 〈B,∧,′ , ρ〉 are described by the following set C of
ordered pairs: 〈m1, a2〉, 〈m2, b2〉, 〈m3, c2〉, 〈m4, d2〉, 〈m5, a2 ∨ b2 ∨ c2 ∨ d2〉 (= 〈m5, e2〉). (Here, a2 is the strongest
consequence of purchase, b2 the strongest consequence of inheritance, etc.) Note that G ∪ C ⊆ ρ and that M is a set
of intervenients from B1 to B2 in 〈B,∧,′ , ρ〉.
Let the joining-space J from B1 = 〈B1,∧,′ , ρ | B1〉 to B2 = 〈B2,∧,′ , ρ | B2〉 be characterised by G and C in the
following sense: J is the joining-space non-redundantly produced by M (see Section 2.3.2). Then m1 corresponds to
〈a1, a2〉, m2 corresponds to 〈b1, b2〉, m3 corresponds to 〈c1, c2〉, m4 corresponds to 〈d1, d2〉 and m5 corresponds to
〈e1, e2〉. Each of 〈a1, a2〉, 〈b1, b2〉, 〈c1, c2〉, 〈d1, d2〉 and 〈e1, e2〉 is a minimal joining in J (see Fig. 3).
We note that, under plausible presuppositions, the negations m′1, . . . ,m′5 (not purchase, not inheritance etc.) are
intervenients in S corresponding to the “negation pairs” 〈a′1, a′2〉, 〈b′1, b′2〉, . . . , 〈e′1, e′2〉. This is to assume that a2 (the
strongest consequence of purchase) is unique for purchase, and, analogously for inheritance etc.
Also we note that, under plausible assumptions, {m1, . . . ,m4} is a base of intervenients for J in the sense of
Section 2.3.2. (Note that {m1, . . . ,m5} is not such a base.) Furthermore, we note that, for M = {m1, . . . ,m5}, the as-
signment of pairs 〈x1, x2〉 ∈ B1 ×B2 to the elements of M is a functionM :M −→ B1 ×B2 and the triple 〈B1,M,B2〉
is a gic-system in the sense of Section 2.3.5.
3.4. Ownership as corresponding to a coupling
We recall the example of the previous subsection with 〈B1,B2, J 〉 lying within S = 〈B,∧,′ , ρ〉. Now let us change
the example so that, among intermediaries, we only take into account the intermediary ownership m5. The inter-
mediaries purchase m1, inheritance m2, occupation m3, specification m4 are ignored and likewise their specific
consequences a2, b2, c2, d2. Thus let S = 〈B,∧,′ , ρ〉 be exchanged for S∗ = 〈B∗,∧,′ , ρ∗〉, where m5 (ownership)
is a member of B∗, but where a2, b2, c2, d2 and m1, . . . ,m4 are not members of B∗ and where ρ∗ is restricted accord-
ingly. We assume that subset B∗1 of B∗ is the same as B1 in the previous example with, among others, the elements
a1, b1, c1, d1, indicating conditions such as making a contract, having a particular kinship relationship etc. In S∗, (like
in S), e1 is the weakest ground for m5 and e2 is the strongest consequence of m5. The set M of intervenients from
B1 to B∗ has m5 as its only member (see Fig. 4).2
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We can assume that in 〈B1,B∗2, J ∗〉, the pairs 〈e1, e2〉, 〈e′1, e′2〉 are the only members of minJ .20 Therefore{〈e1, e2〉, 〈e′1, e′2〉} is a pair coupling (see Section 2.2.7) and, in the example, the intermediaries m5, m′5 (ownership,
not ownership) correspond to the members of this pair coupling.
If we disregard the issue of the negation m′5, this system is strikingly similar to Ross’s scheme, since Ross (like
Wedberg) does not take into account such consequences that are specific to particular modes of acquisition such as
purchase, inheritance, occupation, etc.
3.5. Two examples of extendability
3.5.1. “Relationship similar to being married” and ground-extendability
We recall that an intervenient m is ground-extendable in an sBa S0 = 〈B,∧,′ , ρ0〉 if there is an sBa S1 =
〈B,∧,′ , ρ1〉 such that m is ground-stronger in S1 than in S0 (i.e., supposing that m corresponds to 〈a1, a2〉 in S0
and to 〈b1, b2〉 in S1, that a1S1b1 and b2R2a2) and such that ρ0 ⊆ ρ1. Let “relationship similar to being married”
be as described in Section 1.2.4 with a1, . . . , a11 and the intervenient m in S0. Then, as stated previously, we have
a1 ∧ · · · ∧ a11ρ0m. Next, we can suppose that we do not have, for example, a1 ∧ a2 ∧ a3 ∧ a4ρ0m (where a1 is cohab-
iting, a2 is housekeeping in common, a3 is having children in common and a4 is having sexual intercourse). However,
we can suppose that there is an sBa S1 = 〈B,∧,′ , ρ1〉 such that ρ0 ⊆ ρ1 and such that a1 ∧ a2 ∧ a3 ∧ a4ρ1m. Then, it
follows that m is ground-extendable in S0 since m is ground-stronger in S1 than in S0. (See Section 2.3.3.)
3.5.2. Ownership and consequence-extendability
Similarly, we recall that an intervenient m is consequence-extendable in an sBa S0 = 〈B,∧,′ , ρ0〉 if there is an sBa
S1 = 〈B,∧,′ , ρ1〉 such that m is consequence-stronger in S1 than in S0 (i.e., supposing that m corresponds to 〈a1, a2〉
in S0 and to 〈b1, b2〉 in S1, that a1R1b1 and b2S2a2) and such that ρ0 ⊆ ρ1. (Cf. Section 2.3.3.)
To illustrate, let “x is the owner of estate y” be represented by an intervenient m in S0, Let us suppose that for S0
it holds that mρ0(a1 ∧ a2 ∧ · · · ∧ ai) while it does not hold that mρ0ai+1. The normative condition ai+1 might be, for
example that x is permitted to erect a barbed-wire fence around the entire estate y preventing others from entering on
y. There might be an sBa S1 such that for S1 it holds that ρ0 ⊆ ρ1 and such that mρ1ai+1. Then, it follows that m is
consequence-extendable in S0 since m is consequence-stronger in S1 than in S0.
3.5.3. A remark on the “Counts-as” theory
When a rule r of a legal system N attaches an intermediary m, e.g., “x and y have made a contract to the effect
that z“, to a conjunction a of facts, the rule r can be expressed in different ways, e.g. “if a then m”, or, sometimes, “a
counts as m”. As appears from the foregoing, in our formal representation of N by a cis model of an sBa 〈B,∧,′ , ρ〉,
we represent such a statement in N by aρm, which is read “a implies m”. A sentence “a implies m”, represented
20 Thus in the Bjs 〈B∗1 ,B∗2 , J ∗〉 lying within S∗, B∗2 is generated by those simple conditions that are consequences attached in common to
ownership, regardless of mode of acquisition.
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are external sentences, relative to N .21 Insofar as our concern is representation of sentences within N , we deal with
internal sentences rather than external.
A logical analysis of external sentences of the kind “x counts-as y in s”, where s is an institution (s can be a
normative system), was proposed by Jones and Sergot in [12,13].22 As mentioned in the introduction (Section 2.1),
the work of Jones and Sergot on “Counts-as” has been continued by a number of other authors. This subsequent work
has many facets, developed over the past ten years. Here, we will be content, by an example, merely to suggest how
some of the material dealt with in the Counts-as theory might be represented in our theory.
In [9, p. 2] the following example is given of three kinds of Counts-as:
It is a rule of normative system Γ that conveyances transporting people or goods count as vehicles; it is always the
case that bikes count as conveyances transporting people or goods but not that bikes count as vehicles; therefore,
in the context of normative system Γ , bikes count as vehicles.
According to [9, p. 2], the first premise states a rule of Γ and is a constitutive Counts-as, the second premise states
a generally acknowledged classification, thus states a general classificatory Counts-as, and the conclusion states a
classification that holds only in Γ and is a Counts-as brought about by Γ though it is not a constitutive Counts-as.
The example can be further developed by the assumption that in Γ vehicles are not admitted in public parks (cf.
[8, p. 615]).
If counts-as sentences are seen as internal to a normative system Γ , a representation of the example might be made
in terms of Fig. 5. (Note that, in Fig. 5, “|” means relative product.)
We can conceive of the example in such a way that “being a vehicle” is an intervenient from B1 to B2 corresponding
to the pair 〈 being a conveyance, being prohibited in parks 〉 in B1 ×B2 (cf. Section 2.3.1 and Proposition 7).
In the present paper there is no room for going into possible developments of the example in terms of gic-systems,
bases of intervenients and negations of intervenients. A brief comment should be made, however, on how we might
represent something similar to the distinction between three kinds of Counts-as made by Grossi, Meyer and Dignum.
We can assume that relation R1 (a subset of B1 × B1) represents implications that hold in an uncontroversial way
independently of the instituted rules of Γ . In contrast, the set of minimal joinings minJ1,3 (a subset of B1 × B3) can
be seen as expressing implications that are instituted by the rules in Γ . If this view is taken, distinctions can be made
as follows. (We write b, c, v for “bicycle”, “conveyance”, “vehicle”.) Firstly, the general classification of bicycles as
conveyances is due to 〈b, c〉 ∈ R1 (“it is always the case that bikes count as conveyances”). Secondly, the classification
of conveyances as vehicles is due to 〈c, v〉 ∈ minJ1,3 (“It is a rule of normative system Γ that conveyances . . . count
as vehicles”). Thirdly, the classification of bicycles as vehicles is due to 〈b, v〉 ∈ R1|minJ1,3 (the relative product).
4. The methodology of intermediate concepts
In Section 3, we illustrated the use of our formal theory by analysing a number of (mostly legal) intermediaries.
The question now to be posed is which rational principles underlie the use of intermediaries in normative systems.
21 On the distinction between internal and external sentences, see e.g., [36] and [17]. As just mentioned above, in some contexts, a sentence
“a counts as m”, where no reference to N occurs, can be used as an internal sentence, expressing a rule in N .
22 The original motivation of Jones and Sergot was, so it seems, to give a formal characterisation of “institutionalised power”, see [13, pp. 349 ff].
As Jones and Sergot are aware, however (see [13, p. 352]), the statement “According to normative system/institution s, if agent x sees to it that A,
then agent x sees to it that F ”, formalised by ExA ⇒s ExF , is wider than what corresponds to institutionalised power. (A counter-example to
ExA ⇒s ExF as corresponding to legal power is obtained, e.g. if A is substituted by “x intentionally kills y” and F is substituted by “x murders
y”.) In [15, pp. 196, 211], some passages from classical jurisprudential works (Brinz, Bierling, Ross) on the subject are quoted, and it is clear that a
full formal characterisation of legal power (“rechtliches Können”) is a complex task. For example, Lindahl ([15, p. 197], cf p. 211 on Brinz) points
at the complexity of the task to provide a formal analysis of such a putative analysandum as “if agent x performs an action imposed or adopted by
the law for achieving that F , then x brings about that F ”. Contrary to what is suggested in [13, p. 351], Lindahl in the work quoted does not say
or hold that an agent’s legal power in this traditional sense can be analysed by an agent’s practical possibility to achieve a normative result (even
though such possibility, in another sense, might be called “rechtliches Können” as well). Admittedly, Lindahl in [15, pp. 197 ff] is too dismissive
about the importance of the traditional notion of legal power.
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In Section 2.2.3, we suggested that if a normative system is represented by an sBa S = 〈B,∧,′ , ρ〉, it is often of
interest to study Bjs’s which lie within S , e.g., a Bjs 〈B1,B2, J 〉 where B1 = 〈B1,∧,′ ,R1〉 consists of descriptive
conditions and B2 = 〈B2,∧,′ ,R2〉 consists of normative conditions. Next, in Sections 2.2.4, 2.2.6 and 2.3.2 on con-
nectivity, bases for a joining-space, and bases of intervenients, as well as in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 on applications, we
underlined the central function of minimal joinings. This central function of minimal joinings has a bearing on the
rational method of formulating a normative system by a norm-giver. (See also Section 1.2.2 on the Ross–Wedberg
reduction of the number of rules from p · n to p + n.) If the norm-giver formulates a system by rules that can be
represented as a base of minimal joinings, efficiency of expression and efficient inference can be achieved. Another
related feature of this method is greater facility when it comes to accomplishing a change in the system. Thus, if, for
example, a legal rule r is represented by a minimal joining
〈a1 ∨ b1 ∨ c1, a2 ∧ b2 ∧ c2 ∧ d2〉,
a change of the system can be achieved by dropping or adding disjuncts/conjuncts. This measure is much simpler
than separately dropping or adding joinings that are not minimal. From a theoretical perspective, we can study
transitions from one normative system to another due to changes made by the norm-giver. This can be accomplished
by an investigation of the formal structure of the set of minimal joinings. (See [22], for a point of departure in this
direction.)
When an intervenient m is said to “correspond” to a minimal joining 〈a1, a2〉 (see Section 2.3.1), in a sense, m is a
“name” for this minimal joining. When an intermediary is represented by such an intervenient m, this “name” fulfils a
useful function.23 Thus, from the introduction (above Section 1.2.1), we recall the scheme of “facts, links and deontic
positions”, where links are exemplified by concepts such as ownership, valid contract, citizenship, property, tort, trust.
In the formal representation of a legal system they can be represented by intervenients. Dispensing with the concepts
represented by these intervenients would largely impede legal reasoning, which, to a great extent, is concerned with
gradually changing rules or making their content more precise by adaptations of ground-open or consequence-open
concepts of the system. Similar considerations can hold for other systems than legal systems.
Moreover, consider the situation where a norm-giver is to construct a new system of norms. One method available
is to construct a gic-system 〈B1,M,B2〉, where B1 is a set of grounds, B2 is a set of consequences, M is a function
23 In a restricted sense, the same “normative content” can be formulated with or without intermediaries. Making use of our formal representation,
suppose a Bjs 〈B1,B2, J 〉 lies within a quasi-ordering S = 〈B,∧,′ , ρ〉 such that M ⊆ B for a set M of intervenients from B1 to B2. Then
〈B1,B2, J 〉 lies as well within a quasi-ordering S∗ = 〈B∗,∧,′ , ρ∗〉 where B∗ differs from B only insofar as B∗ ∩ M = ∅ and where ρ∗ =
ρ|B∗.
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determined by 〈B1,M,B2〉. (See Sections 2.3.5 and 2.3.2.)
As illustrated by the Boche–Berserk example above (Section 3.2), there are as well intermediaries that should be
represented by intervenients corresponding to joinings that are not minimal (“mere joinings”). With regard to such
intermediaries, considerations relating to economy of expression and efficient inference do not justify having these
intervenients in the system rather than (only) intervenients corresponding to minimal joinings. What comes into focus
is rather adaptation to linguistic usage and well entrenched distinctions. Here, we can distinguish two situations:
One is the case where, in the representation of the system, several grounds a1, b1, . . . have the same strongest
consequence a2, and there are intervenients m1,m2, . . . such that m1 corresponds to 〈a1, a2〉, m2 to 〈b1, a2〉 etc. (cf. the
intervenients Boche and Berserk). For justifying that m1,m2, . . . are in the system, what is essential is the distinction
between the grounds represented by a1, b1, . . . due to, what was called above “adaptation to linguistic usage and well
entrenched distinctions”. Thus, nationalities (German, Swedish etc.) belong to well entrenched classifications, and
this can justify having one concept represented by m1 and another represented by m2.24
The other situation is where, in the representation of the system, a1 is the weakest ground for several consequences
a2, b2, . . . and there are intermediaries represented by intervenients m1,m2, . . . such that m1 corresponds to 〈a1, a2〉,
m2 to 〈a1, b2〉 etc. where these pairs are mere joinings. In this situation, for justifying that intermediaries represented
by m1,m2 are in the system, what is in focus is the difference in kind between the consequences represented by a2
and b2. It seems, however, that, in actual practice, it is rare that two different intermediaries are links from exactly one
and the same ground to two different normative consequences.25 We leave the matter open here.
5. Conclusion
As exemplified in the foregoing, intermediate concepts (intermediaries) play an essential role in normative systems.
In Section 1.4, we gave some features of intermediaries. In the formal part, we outlined a theory of intervenients and
took a first step to a typology of intervenients. This theory is intended as a means for analysing intermediate concepts,
and we have sketched its application in a few cases. We have focused on systems consisting of an algebra of grounds
and an algebra of consequences and a system of intervenients between these algebras. In further developments of the
theory, we intend to extend the investigation to incorporate series of systems of intervenients, where the consequence-
structure in one system can be the ground-structure in another, and the intervenients in one system can be grounds or
consequences in another. Consequently, in more complex normative systems, there can be hierarchies of intervenients
worth investigating. Another interesting task is to investigate the formal structure of the base for a joining-space and
how this structure is altered when the normative system is changed.
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